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Abstract 
Corruption is one of the most important factors harms all aspects of macroeconomic performances in all countries especially 
developing countries. In this paper the impact of corruption on inflation tax in selected developing countries was investigated. In 
an earlier work  we applied Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for corruption and used different definitions of inflation tax. 
However ,present paper employs Control of Corruption Index (CCI) as a measurement of corruption and also apply  different 
definitions for inflation tax.  The study concentrated on a sample of 40 countries consist of Middle East and North Africa 
countries and other selected developing countries, for which necessary data were available for the period 2003-2010. Our 
findings based on a panel data regression model support the view of a positive relationship between corruption and inflation tax. 
Therefore, policies to alleviate corruption are recommended in these countries. 
Keywords: Control of Corruption Index( CCI), Inflation Tax, Panel  data, Developing  countries. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, a phenomenon broadly referred to as corruption has attracted a lot of attention in all countries. 
Governments have fallen because of accusations of corruption, prominent politicians (including president of 
countries and prime ministers) have lost their official positions in all developed and developing countries.  
Corruption is not a new phenomenon. Two thousand years ago, Kautilya, defined corruption as the misuse of public 
office for private gain that has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years. Nowadays different organizations 
regard corruption as major obstacles to good policy making. The ways in which corruption can impact on the 
economy are varied, and it is important to understand the range and diversity of the mechanisms involved. The  
relationship between corruption and inflation tax has been identified in some empirical studies indirectly (e.g., 
Blackburn, Neanidis and Haque 2009). These and other investigations provide insight into the many channels 
through which corruption with take effect. We can mention a non-exhaustive list of these effects as follow: 
corruption would lead to a misallocation of  skills away from productive  activities (e.g., Acemoglu 1995); 
 
* .Corresponding Author: Tel.: +98-911-111-1456 
   E-mail address: Jafarisa@yahoo.com 
2-Corruption and Inflation Tax in selected developing countries 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of Prof. Dr. Huseyin Arasli
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 12 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of Prof. Dr. Hü eyin Arasli
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
442   Ahmad Jafari Samimi and Maryam Abedini /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  62 ( 2012 )  441 – 445 
corruption would undermine  the protection of the property rights, create obstacles to doing business and impede 
innovation and technological transfer (Hall and Jones 1999; North 1990; World Bank 2002); corruption may lead to 
firms to expand less rapidly, to adopt inefficient technologies and to shift their operations to the informal sector 
(Svensson 2005); corruption may limit the extent of a co  inflows of foreign 
investment (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004; Wei 2000); corruption may lead to costly concealment  and detection of 
illegal income, resulting in a deadweight loss of resources ( Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 
2007); corruption may compromise human development through a deterioration in the scale of public health  and 
education programs (Blackburn and Sarmah 2008; Gupta et al. 2000; Reinikka and Svensson 2005); and corruption 
may lead to a general misallocation of public expenditures as certain areas of spending ( military spending) are 
targeted more for their capacity to generate bribes than their potential to improve living standards ( Gupta et al. 
2001; Mauro 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). 
Sivapalan et al., (2011)  analyzed the impact of trade restriction and facilitation regulations on the cross border trade 
of Dumai in The methodology consisted of interviewing key government officials and 
cross border trades and examining documentary sources .According to this study, the institutional restriction on and 
and local economy. In conclusion, local states would be handicapped in enabling cross border trades if cross border 
regulations were controlled by the central government. As such, further cross border trade studies, should explore 
inter and intra state relations gauge further insights into the complexity of the matter. 
Jafari and Jamshidbaygi, (2011) studied the relationship between budget deficit and inflation in Iran in the period of 
1990- 2008. They concluded that there is a positive and significant impact of budget deficit on monetary variables 
and as a result on inflation. They have also found a positive and significant impact of price index on budget deficit. 
Finally regarding the sensitivity analysis their finding support the robustness of their estimation results with respect 
to definitions of inflation as well as money supply. 
Jafari and Hosseinmardi, (2011) used a sample of 25 selected developing countries from 2000-2008, examined 
women participation in politics and labor force and some other social impact on gender corruption. Specifically 
investigate the hypothesis is that increasing women participation in parliament and labor force can reduce financial 
corruption. 
2. Model, Data and Estimation Methodology: 
The basic model is estimated for a sample of 2003-20010  on panel data. 
= + + )+ + + + +  
    First we use Levin, Lin, Chu unit root test to test the stationary of the variables .The results  show that all  
variables are stable. 
 
Table 1.The results related to stationary test for dependent variable.   
 
 
Variable 
 
Statistic test 
 
Unit root test result 
 -13.97 Stability 
 
4- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP (Friedman definition). 
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 -6.43 Stability 
** -5.88 Stability 
Source: Authors calculations using Eviews 6 
 
Table 2.The results related to stationary test for independent variables. 
 
 
Variable 
 
Statistic test 
 
Unit root test result 
) -1.6 Stability 
 -4.2 Stability 
 -3.2 Stability 
 -3.7 Stability 
 -12.7 Stability 
 -5.1 Stability 
 -7.9 Stability 
Source: Authors calculations using Eviews 6 
 
      In Hausman test null hypothesis show Fixed Effect. According to the above test, as shows in table 1, we run 
some of the regressions with Random Effect test and others with Fixed Effect test. 
 
Table 3: Model s regression findings. 
 
Variable Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) 
C  
***(-5.78E+19) 
 
***(-1.50E+11) 
 
** (-8.22E+09) 
SFT *** (2.12E+19)  
***(-1.55E+09) 
 
***(7.09E+09) 
LOG(PGDP) *** (3.92E+18) **(2.86E+10)  (-8789142) 
CORR(CCI) *** (-3.35E+19) (-8.17E+09) ***(-8.80E+09) 
IN  (6.33E+16) ***(5.01E+08) ***(3.24E+08) 
IT(F)(-1) ***(-2.78E+10)   
IT(IB)(-1)  ***(5.93E+10)  
IT(V)(-1)   *** (-2.58E+10) 
CORR(CPI)*DUM ***(2.26E+19) ***(2.97E+10) ***( 7.95E+09) 
R- squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.99 0.99 0.99 
Htest result R.E. F.E. R.E. 
N 114 114 114 
 
5- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP (International Bank definition). 
6- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP (Tanzi definition). 
7- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP with one lag (Friedman definition). 
8- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP with one lag (International Bank definition). 
9- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP with one lag (Tanzi definition). 
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Source: Researcher calculations using Eviews 6. 
     *, **&*** respectively significant in 10 ,5 &1  level. 
 
According to equation 1, Friedman definition for inflation tax and Control of Corruption Index (CCI) for 
corruption have been applied. Based on regression results , the estimated parameters coefficient of CORR in 
equation 1 is negative and significant, so the more increase at controlling of the corruption in a country will 
contribute to reducing the inflation tax. The coefficient of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (SFT) is positive 
and also significant. GDP per capita (PGDP) is positive and significant too. The coefficient of inflation (IN) is  
positive but it is not significant.   
The coefficient of the ratio of inflation tax with a lag  is negative and significant. The coefficient of 
Dummy variable is positive and it is significant. To investigate the difference between MENA country's 
performances and the average of other countries, we plus the coefficient of Dummy variable with the 
coefficient of corruption index. If the result is near the coefficient of corruption index, means that any 
difference cannot be seen between MENA country son with other countries; and if 
the result is far from the coefficient of corruption index, means that a significant difference between MENA 
country es can be seen. According to this, the result shows that the 
relationship between corruption and inflation tax, in MENA, would not have a significant difference in 
comparison with the average of other countries. 
       According to equation 2, World Bank definition for inflation tax and Control of Corruption Index for 
corruption (CCI) has been used. Accordingly, the estimated  coefficient of Corruption (CORR) in equation 2 is 
negative but not significant. The coefficient of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (SFT) is negative and 
significant. GDP per capita (PGDP) is positive and significant. The coefficient of inflation (IN) is positive and  
significant. The coefficient of the ratio of inflation tax with a lag  is positive and significant. 
According to the coefficient of Dummy variable and the coefficient of corruption index, the relationship 
between corruption and inflation tax, in MENA, would have a significant difference in comparison with the 
average of other countries. 
      According to equation 3, Tanzi definition for inflation tax and Control of Corruption Index for corruption 
(CCI) have been applied. Based on regression results, the estimated coefficient of Corruption (CORR) in this 
equation is negative and significant. The coefficient of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (SFT) is positive and 
significant. GDP per capita (PGDP) is negative and insignificant. The coefficient of inflation (IN) is positive and 
significant. The coefficient of the ratio of inflation tax with a lag  is negative and significant. 
According to the Dummy variable, the relationship between corruption and inflation tax, in MENA, would  
have a significant difference in comparison with the average performances of other countries under 
consideration. 
3- Conclusion remarks 
Corruption is one of the most important factors creating inflation tax through budget deficit. Preset paper 
employed Control of Corruption Index (CCI) as a measurement of corruption and  concentrated on a sample of 40 
countries consist of Middle East and North Africa countries and other selected developing countries, for which 
necessary data were available for the period 2003-2010 The results show that, in the countries under 
consideration, higher controlling of corruption, would lead to a lower inflation tax rate. In addition, 
corruption is sensitive to different definition of corruption.  
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